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INTRODUCTION

In 1994,

nearly sixty percent of America's gross

domestic product was generated by its corporations 1

.

Ever

since the advent of the large industrial corporation in the

United States, there has been periodic outrage at payment
made to its top executives.

Executive compensation level

has rose steadily during the 1980s 2

Not only did the

.

level of executive compensation rise, but during that same
period,

the rate of executive compensation growth was
the rate of growth of the average

greatly exceeding

American's salary 3

For example, by the early 1990s,

.

the

average salary of a CEO was prodigious under any standard 4
Such

a

magnitude of executive compensation was difficult to

comprehend for the average American 5

.

During the same

Bureau of economic analysis, U.S Department of Commerce,
surv. Current bus. (Jan 1994)
2 See for example Shareholders Rights,
Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess. 49 (1991)
1

.

3

Id.

at 16

Bevis Logstreth

Nancy Kane, Shareholders Growing Role
(pt. 1), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1992
5
Robert A. Rosenblatt, Firms Must Fully Report Officers
Pay, L.A TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at Al, A34
4

.

&

in Executive Compensation

2

time,

America was suffering through

moderate recession 6

a

.

The unemployed were thus confronted with stories of multi-

million dollar salaries paid to CEOs 7

,

and the gap between

what they were earning and what they were thought to be

worth seemed gigantic 8

.

In 1992,

excessive executive

compensation was publicly targeted, and even became

a

widely discussed populist topic during the 1992 election
year.

Nevertheless, such

not new.

In 1983,

subject with

a

a

debate over executive pay is

Professor Vagts began an article on the

recitation of the business and political

background that could easily be used nowadays

:

Tremors

«

here and there indicate that a new wave of concern about
the generosity of management compensation may be on the
way.

From the courts one observe

a

string of cases

attacking compensation practices, particularly stock
options and other stock plans...
Even some business writers have arched eyebrows over
the recent surge in management compensation that had

carried the best paid executives to well over the one

million dollar line, which seemed for years— like the stock
market's Dow Jones « one thousand »--to serve as

a

Andrew R. Bronstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set
CEO Pay ? The Press ? Congress ? Shareholders ?, Harv.
Bus. Rev., May-June 1992, at 28
6

7

Id.

8

The Boss's Pay, Wall Street J., April 21,

1993,

at R13

3

psychological barrier to advances » 9
forty years ago
«

J. A.

.

In the same way,

Livingston predicted an

investigation of executive remuneration » 10 which

«

could

make unpleasant headlines » 1]-.
The public criticism executives compensation faced is
not only due to the fact that compensation has became so
high,

but also to the fact that those executives are not

always expected to receive such compensation.

traditional rule is that

a

Indeed, the

director is not entitled to

compensation for services as director. Thus, in Cahall v.
Lof land 12 the court held that directors were presumed to

serve without compensation 13
not without exception.

.

Nevertheless, such rule is

Indeed,

in Lofland v.

Cahall 14 the

Supreme Court of Delaware set forth four factors which it
found were required to be considered in determining the
right of directors to receive compensation for services

rendered their corporation.
directors of

a

First,

the Court held that

corporation were trustees for the

stockholders, and that their acts were therefore governed
by the rules applicable to such a relation, which exacted

from them the utmost good faith and fair dealing,

° Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation
or for the Courts ?, 8 J. Corp. L. 231 (1983)

10
11

The American Stockholder
Id,

at 230

12

114 A.

13

Id.

14

118 A.

224

(1921)

at 229
1

(1922)

(1958),

at 229

:

For the Markets

4

especially where their individual interest were
concerned 15

.

Second,

the Court stated that directors had

no right to compensation for services rendered within the

scope of their duties as directors,

unless it was

authorized by the charter, by-laws, or other stockholders
of the company 16

.

Third,

the Court added that directors

had no right to compensation for services rendered outside
their duties as directors unless there had been an express

contract to pay for such services, or, as some cases hold,
unless the services were clearly outside the their duties
as directors and were performed under circumstances

sufficient to show that it was understood that the services
were to be paid for by the corporation 17

Finally,

.

the

court held that a contract to pay for such services had to
be made with the directors or other proper corporate

officers who had no personal interest, directly or

indirectly in the contract, and who were competent to
represent the company in the transaction 18

.

As will be

later discussed, the Lofland case 19 still applies nowadays.
If no contract has been made with such directors or proper

corporate officers, the courts may allow recovery for
services rendered based on the existence of an implied

15

Id.

16

id.

17

Id.

18

id.

19

id.

at

3

5

contract, or on the theory of quantum meruit 20

.

corporation 21

.

rules apply to the officers of

When

a

The same

director or officer is entitled to recover some

a

compensation for services rendered to the corporation, two
main limitations apply.

First,

such

the notion of conflict of interest.

arises whenever

a

a

right is limited by

A conflict of interest

director or officer acts both as

a

representative of the corporation and in his own interest.
Therefore, the concept of conflict of interest will

interfere in the fixation of officers and directors

compensation in different situations

:

director-officer

a

will have a conflict of interest in connection with any

action by the board of directors adopting or approving

a

contract fixing compensation for his services as an officer
or employee of the corporation.

Likewise, an officer will

have a conflict of interest even if he is not part of the

board of directors adopting his compensation if he
exercises

domination upon the said board of directors

a

(see infra)

.

The second limitation applying to officers or

directors compensation is the one of waste or gift of
corporate assets.

Hence,

an agreement to pay executive

compensation that is unreasonable or excessive may be held

unenforceable against the corporation.

20 Technicorp International II,
(1997), not reported in A. 2d
21

Id.

Inc.

v.

Johnston

,

1997 WL 538671

Keeping those facts in mind, the aim of this thesis is
to introduce the rules applied by American jurisdictions
(and more specially Delaware)
or directors compensation,

when confronted with officers

in order to establish a road map

for the corporations with regard to such compensation.

The

first chapter of the thesis will therefore deal with the

fixation of officers and directors compensation, whereas
the second chapter will study the standards such

compensation has to meet in order to be held valid.
Finally,

the third chapter will look at the possibility of

compensating officers and directors for services rendered
when no compensation has legally been adopted.

CHAPTER

I

FIXATION OF OFFICERS COMPENSATION

I

GENERALLY

.

Generally an officer of

a

corporation is held to be

without authority to fix or increase his own salary 22
However,

.

corporate directors may, by statute, charter,

bylaws or the stockholders, be given the power to fix their
own salaries 23

Statutes in many jurisdictions grant such

.

authority to directors 24

section 122(5) of

For example,

.

the Delaware General Corporation Law provides for the

compensation by

a

corporation of its officers and agents 25

Section 122 provides in pertinent part
«

:

Every corporation created under this chapter shall

have power to

:

22

14 A. Corpus Juris, 143
« Directors are precluded from fixing,
increasing or voting compensation to themselves for either past or
future services by them as directors or officers, unless they are
expressly authorized to do so by the charter or by the stockholders
:

23 Pogostin v Rice

(Del.

24

Sup.

)

480 A2d 619

»

(1984)

Many of such statutes are patterned after the Model Business
Corporation Act which provides that the board of directors shall have
authority to fix the compensation of directors unless otherwise
provided in the article of incorporation. Model Business Corporation
Act § 35.
25

8

Del.

C.

Sec.

122(5)

.

.

8

Appoint such officers and agents as the business of
the corporation requires and to pay or otherwise provide
for them suitable compensation. » 26

.

the board of director is vested with

In addition,

large powers as to the amount of the compensation, powers

conferred by Section 141

(h)

of the Delaware General

Corporation Law 27 which states that 11:
«

Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of

incorporation or bylaws, the board of directors shall have
the authority to fix the compensation of directors. » 28

.

Finally, directors have control over the form of the

remuneration.

Indeed,

Corporation Law 29

,

section 157 of Delaware General

which confers broad discretion upon

directors in the issuance of stock option and rights,

provide in pertinent part
«

:

Subject to any provisions in the certificate of

incorporation, every corporation may create and issue,

.

.

rights or options entitling the holders thereof to purchase
from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any
class or classes, such rights or options to be evidenced by
.

.

such instrument ... as shall be approved by the board

.

of directors.

26

Id.

27

id.

28

8

29

Del.

C.

Sec.

141

Del.

C.

Sec.

157

(h)

9

The terms upon which,

including the time or times

which may be limited or unlimited in duration, at or within

which

;

and the price or prices at which any such shares

may be purchased from the corporation upon the exercise of
any such right or option,

shall be stated in the

certificate of incorporation, or in

a

resolution adopted by

the board of directors providing for the creation and issue
of such rights of

options, and,

in every case,

shall be

set forth or incorporated by reference in the instrument or

instruments evidencing such rights or options. In the
absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of
the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of

such rights or options and the sufficiency thereof shall be

conclusive. » 30
Similarly,

section 5.03(a)

(2)

and

(3)

of the American

Law Institute is intended to vest wide discretion in

disinterested directors as to the fixation of officers and
directors compensation 31

.

Comment

e.

of section 5.03 32

precise that it is not intended to limited director's

discretion in fashioning compensation arrangements or

30 id.
31

A.L.I, sec. 5.03 which state as a general rule that « A
director [s 1 13] or senior executive [s.1.33] who receives
compensation from the corporation for services in that capacity
fulfills the duty of fair dealing with respect to the compensation if
.

.

(2) the compensation is authorized in advance by disinterested
directors ...
(3) the compensation is ratified by disinterested directors...
;

A.L.I sec. 5.03, comment
arrangements

e.

Limitation on compensation

».

10

levels of compensation, to those level that are usual in
the industry in which

a

corporation operates.

In the

contrary, under section 5.03 a corporation should be free
to award liberal or novel forms of compensation to attract

valuable executives 33

.

providing

In the same way,

incentives such as stock options at level higher that might

usually be considered appropriate should be permitted under
section 5.03 on the basis of the situation in which the

corporation finds itself 34
There is

a

.

long established principle in Delaware

corporation law that directors of
corporation and its shareholders

a
a

corporation owe the
duty of loyalty 35

.

This

duty mandates that directors refrain from self-dealing and

place the interest of the corporation and its shareholders
over any personal interest the director may possess that is
not equally shared by the shareholders 36

33

id.

34

id.

.

The question is

35
This duty was indeed described by Chief Justice Layton in duty was
indeed described by Chief Justice Layton in Gulf v. Loft, Inc. 5 A. 2d
503, at 510 (1939)
« Corporate officers and directors are not
permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further
their private interests .. .A public policy, existing through the years,
and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristic and
motives, has established a rule that demands of corporate officer or
director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty, not affirmatively to protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it
of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly
bring to it, or enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of its powers.
The rule that requires an undivided and
unselfish loyalty to the corporation demand that there shall be no
conflict between duty and self interest. »
,

:

36

Rales v. Blasban,

634 A. 2d 927,

at 936

(1993)

11

thus how to reconcile this with the power of directors to

vote compensation.

II.

FIXATION OF COMPENSATION AND SELF-DEALING

Director self-interest typically arises whenever

director either has

divided loyalty are present, or when

a

received or is entitled to receive

personal financial

a

benefit from the challenged transaction which is not

equally shared by the stockholders 37

.

It appears pretty

clearly that such will be the case whenever
vote upon his own compensation.

a

director will

Similarly, there will be

a

self-interest transaction every time that the directors
voting upon it will be

dominated or controlled by an

individual interested in the transaction 38

.

This will

often be the case nowadays as directors have more and more
influence, and transactions are rarely at arm-length.

The

American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance
answer this question in the body of section 5.03 itself.
Indeed,

it specifies that the compensation of directors or

senior executives must be authorized in advance or ratified
by disinterested directors 39

In comment g.,

.

it is noticed

that under the A.L.I principles the board of directors will
be disinterested in voting compensation for one of its

37
38

39

Poqostin

v.

Rice

Green v. Phillips
A.L.I,

sec.

5.03

480 A. 2d 619,

,

,

at 623

1996 WL 342093

(1984)

(1996)

(not reported in A. 2d)

12

members as an executive or in some other nondirectorial
capacity, whereas it will be interested if it votes

directorial compensation for itself.
the so called « back-scratching »,

The comment adds that

which constitute in

directors voting to approve each others compensation, is
not a disinterested director's action.

Such rule is far

This situation had been illustrated by the

from being new.

case of Steele v. Gold Fissure Gold Mining Co.

ninety years ago.

In this case,

40

about

the board of directors was

composed of three directors, the salary of two of which was
to be fixed by the resolution attacked.

The resolution had

been adopted and the validity of both salaries had been
Each of the interested director had maintained

challenged.

that « the vote of the other two directors was sufficient
to render the resolution valid. » 41

.

The court had

rejected this argument, holding that where two of the three
directors of

a

corporation where officers whose salaries

were fixed in a single resolution, they were both

disqualified from voting upon
other hand, section 122(5)

such resolution.

42

On the

of the Delaware General

Corporation Law 43 provides no answer on this point.
early Common Law was very intolerant of

40 95 P.
4 1

349

Id.

42

id.

43

8

Del.

C.

(1908)

a

The

director's self-

13

interest.
that

a

Thus,

Cahall 44

it had been stated in Lofland v.

contract to pay compensation to directors or

officers for services rendered had to be made with

directors or other proper corporate officers who had no
personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the contract,
and who were competent to represent the corporation in the

transaction. Indeed, if interested directors participated
in the vote of the decision,

Nevertheless, in Kerbs

or at least voidable.

Eastern Airways, Inc.

upheld

a

this one was considered void,

45

v.

California

the Supreme Court of Delaware had

decision fixing compensation where three of the

eight directors present at the meeting were interested in
it,

on the ground that the said decision had still been

adopted by

majority of disinterested directors.

a

The

court had held that « [t]he presence and vote of interested

directors without more (though perhaps undesirable)
not affect the validity of

majority of

a

should

corporate action taken by

disinterested quorum of directors » 46

a

.

According to the court, the rationale was that « if the
interested directors can influence the disinterested
directors,

they will do so whether they are present or not

and whether they vote or not .» 47

.

It had also been

recognized that directors who were the sole stockholders in

44

118 A. .1

(1922)

45 83 A. 2d 473
4 6

47

id.

Id.

(1951)

14
a

corporation could vote themselves salaries.

Indeed,

courts had pointed to the fact that in the case of a

closely held corporation, where the directors were also the
officers and stockholders, self dealing on salary questions
were inevitable as
case,

therefore,

practical matter.

a

At least in such

a

self-dealing did not of itself renders

void the action of

board of directors in which the

a

interested director participated.
action was voidable in such

a

Whether the board's

case at the instance of a

non-assenting stockholder depended on all the
circumstances, including

a

consideration of the

reasonableness of the action 48
conclusion was that

a

.

The rationale for such

a

closely held corporation, where the

members of the board personally conducted and directed
business,

could not be held to the same strict formalities

as are large corporations.

Since then,

the Delaware

General Assembly has enacted a conflict of interest statute
in 1967,

and this statute has not been amended since

1969 49

Section 144 provide some safe harbor by stating

.

that corporate action should not be invalidated on ground
of conflict of interest if the conflict is disclosed to and

approved by
board or

a

48 Chamber v.

49

a

majority of disinterested members of the

committee of disinterested directors...

Beaver advance Corporation, 140 A. 2d 808

Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, § 144, 56 Del.
as amended by ch. 148, § 7, 57 Del. Laws (1969)
at Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 144 (1991))

Such

(1958)

Laws 151, 170 (1967),
(codified as amended

15

safe harbor is even more useful nowadays where most top

executives are in an unusually strong position to strike

a

favorable bargain, because they exert such influence over
the process of fixing executive compensation

;

therefore,

the task of fixing the compensation of executive is hardly
an arm's-length transaction 50

.

transaction is approved by

majority of disinterested

directors,

a

Furthermore, if the

the transaction cannot be invalidated solely

because an interested director is involved 51

.

Section 144

does not provide the only validation procedure for

interested transactions

;

ratification principles also

apply to transactions that fall outside the scope of the

statutory provisions 52

,

and courts have therefore

determined that the key to upholding an interested
transaction regardless of the applicability of the safe
harbor provision is the approval of some neutral decision-

making body 53

such as shareholders.

,

Nevertheless, as

section 144 applies to contracts between
one or more of its directors,

compensation issue.

But,

a

corporation and

it therefore applies to the

we will see in Chapter II of this

thesis that ratification of

a

transaction by shareholders

50

Derek Bok, The Cost of Talent
How Executives and Professional
Are Paid and How It Affects America 78 (1993) at 98.
Note that
America 78 is a graph comparing the top salaries for CEOs.
;

51
52

53

Flieger

,

Marciano
Oberly

,

351 A. 2d at 222
v.

Nakash

592 A.

,

535 A.

2d at 467

2d 400,

at 402

(1987)

16

still has some influence upon the problem of officers and

directors compensation.
We have just seen that the power of fixing directors'

and officers' compensation belonged to the board of

directors, and that such

a

power could be reconciled with

the duty of loyalty of the directors that mandate them to

refrain from self-dealing.

Nevertheless, self-dealing is

not the only obstacle to the fixation of officers and

directors compensation.

Indeed, we will see that when the

courts review decisions fixing officers' and directors'

compensation, they apply different standards to the

determination of its validity.

CHAPTER II

:

REVIEW OF COMPENSATION

The power of the board of directors to fix

compensation is very important.
unlimited.

Nevertheless, it is not

The corporation has the ability to challenge a

decision establishing directors or officers compensation.
Similarly, dissenting stockholders may bring a derivative

action against such
is challenged,

a

decision.

When

a

board's resolution

the court to which the matter is referred

will first decide whether it has the power to review it or
not.

If the court concludes that it is competent to hear

about the problem, it will then have to apply different

standards in order to determine whether the decision of the

board of directors must be upheld or not.
I.

POWER OF COURTS TO REVIEW OFFICERS COMPENSATION

As a general principle, courts are very hesitant to

review decisions made by the board of directors of a
corporation, including decisions concerning officers or

directors compensation.

A court refusal to review such a

decision may be due either to the application of the
business judgment rule, or because of the ratification of
the decision by a majority of the stockholders of the

17

18

corporation.

Nevertheless, the presumption of validity

created either by the application of the business judgment
rule or by the ratification of the decision by the

shareholders are not irrebutable. Therefore, courts will
review decisions fixing officers or directors compensation
when such presumptions do not apply.

APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

A.

Generally, decisions of the board of directors are

protected by the business judgment rule.

Hence,

been held that executive compensation was

a

ordinarily left to the business judgment of
board of directors 54

matter
a

company's

Nevertheless as we have previously

the main problem with compensation decision is when

seen,

such

.

it has

a

decision is an interested one.

The question

therefore is whether the business judgment rule applies in
such

a

case.

Protection of the business judgment rule can normally
only be claimed by disinterested and independent directors.
But,

the essential element being that the decision is made

by a « disinterested and independent corporate decision

maker

» 55

it will equally apply to an interested director

,

transaction, provided that such transaction was approved by

either

54

55

a

Lewis
Nixon,

committee of independent directors or

v.

Hirsh

,

1994 WL 263551

626 A. 2d at 1376

(1994)

a

majority

(not reported in A.

2d)

.

19

of independent shareholders 56

The business judgment rule

.

is the descendent of the principle that the business and

affairs of

a

Delaware corporation are managed by or under

its board of directors 57

Maldonado 58

,

.

According to Zapata

v.

the purpose of the business judgment rule is

to protect and promote the full exercise of the managerial

power granted to directors in Delaware.

Section 122(5) of

the Delaware General Corporation Law 59 granting the board
of directors the power to adopt compensation,

the business

judgment rule applies to its decisions fixing

compensation 60

The business judgment rule is in fact «

.

presumption that in making
directors of

a

a

a

business decision, the

corporation acted on an informed basis, in

good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interest of the company » 61

.

Thus,

for the

56

See for example Aronson v. Lewis
473 A. 2d 805 (1984), which
provides that if director interest is present in a transaction, and
the transaction is not approved by a majority of disinterested
directors, the business judgment rule is not applicable)
,

5

8 Del. C. § 141(a)
« The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.
If
any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the
powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by
this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by
such any person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation
'

58

59

:

430 A.
8

Del.

2d 779,

C,

sec.

at 782

(1984)

122(5)

60

Journal of Corporation Law, The Corporate Independent Duty as a
Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 1992, citing
Aronson v. Lewis 473 A. 2d 805 (1984)
,

61

Smith

Lewis,

v.

Van Gorkom

473 A. 2d 805

,

488 A. 2d 858
at 812

(1984)

(1985)

at872,

citing

Aronson

v,

20

court to review a decision concerning the compensation of

directors and officers, the party attacking it must rebut
the presumption that it was an informed one 62

,

i.e.

show

that the directors have not informed themselves of all

material information reasonably available prior to making
their business decision 63

.

Such duty of directors to inform themselves prior to
the making of a business decision is greatly detailed in

Smith v. Van Gorkom 64

This duty derives from the

.

fiduciary capacity of the director with regard to the

corporation and its shareholders 65
a

Therefore, when making

.

business decision directors are « bound to act out of

fidelity and honestly in their role as fiduciary » 66

according to the Smith case 67

Indeed,

But

the mere absence of bad

,

faith or fraud is not enough for

fiduciary duty.

.

a

director to fulfill his

the court explained that since the

directors represent the interests of others, they must act
with caution when evaluating the information given to them.
As far as compensation is concerned,

example, deprive the minority of

a

directors may not, for

fair return upon its

investment by way of excessive salaries and other devices

62

id.

63

id.

64

488 A. 2d 858

65

Id.,

66
67

(1985'

citing Weinberger

Michelson

v.

Duncan

488 A. 2d 858

(1985)

,

v.

UOP,

Inc.

407 A. 2d 211

,

457 A. 2d 701

(1979)

at 217

(1983;

21

because of their position 68

or because of a failure to

,

inform themselves before adopting

a

compensation. Hence,

the duty resting on directors to exercise an informed

judgment is

a

The standard of care

duty of care.

applicable in this case has been stated by the same court
Lewis 69

in Aronson v.

:

«

under the business judgment rule

director liability is predicated upon the concepts of gross

negligence

In Smith v.

».

Van Gorkom 70

,

the Supreme court

of Delaware confirmed its previous conclusion and added

that the concept of gross negligence is also the one

applying to determine whether

a

an informed business judgment.

board of directors reached
The standards against which

the conduct of directors must be tested regarding their

exercise of an informed business judgment in approving

compensation is the one of
judgment 71

Indeed,

.

a

person of ordinary sound

a

the court states that it is possible

to infer that a decision granting compensation is not

protected by the business judgment rule because it is

a

decision in which the consideration received by the

corporation is

so inadequate that no person of ordinary

«

sound judgment would deem it worth what the corporation

paid » 72

Furthermore, the court in Aronson indicates that

.

68

Id.,

69

473 A. 2d 805

(1984),

at 812

70

488 A. 2d 858

(1985),

at 873

71

Kaufman

72

Id.

citing Backer

v.

at 5,

Beal

,

v.

Conn,

42 N.Y.S.2d 159 at 166

1983 WL 20295

citing Saxe v. Brady

(1983)
,

(1942)

(not reported in A. 2d)

184 A. 2d 602

(1962)

.
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be considered as a report under § 141(e),

a

report must at

least be pertinent to the subject matter upon which the

board is called to act, and otherwise be entitled to good
faith reliance 76

.

But,

entitled to rely upon

a

the board of directors is not

mere threat of litigation,

acknowledged by counsel, as constituting either

a

legal

advice or any valid basis upon which to pursue an

uninformed course 77

The rationale given by the court is

.

that even if a suit might result from the action taken
this case the rejection of
«

a

(in

merger or tender offer),

Delaware law makes clear that

a

board acting within the

ambit of the business judgment rule faces no ultimate

liability » 78
Finally,

.

in Smith 79 the court considered the question

of the eventual rectification and cure of a board's failure

to reach an informed decision.

In the said case 80

,

the

defendant was arguing that its alleged breach of duty of
care by not reaching an informed decision had been cured by
its subsequent conduct

(after accepting a merger agreement

76
« a member of the board of directors
8 Del. C.
shall in the
performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith
upon the books of accounts or reports made to the corporation by any
of its officers, or by an independent certified public accountant, or
by an appraiser selected with reasonable care by the board of
directors
or in relying in good faith upon other records of the
corporation
:

.

77

Smith

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id,

.

v.

.

.

,

Van Gorkom

at 881

,

488 A. 2d 858

(1984)at 881

.

.
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quite hurriedly,

the board of directors of the corporation

had met again allegedly to reconsider the merger proposal
by amending the agreement)

.

Based on the elements of the

the court held that the subsequent conduct of the

case,

Two

board had not remedied to its breach of duty of care.

conclusions can be drawn from this

the court

first,

:

impliedly recognized the possibility to rectify
information in the making of

a

a

lack of

business decision, second

the court stated that such possibility must be studied with

regard to the particular facts of the case.

eventual curative effects of

a

to the adoption of a decision,

board'

s

As to the

conduct subsequent

the court stated that it

will depend on the reasonableness of the reliance of the

board of directors on the subsequent actions taken

;

once

the court explained that this determination will be

again,

based on the particular facts of the case 81

.

As the definition of the business judgment rule
states,

it is also composed of two other elements

:

good

faith and promotion of the best interest of the company.
Thus,

as well as a decision will not be protected by the

business judgment rule if not informed, it will not be

protected if it has not been made in good faith and in what
the directors believe to be the best interest of the

corporation.

81

Id.

82

1983 WL 20295

In Kaufman v.

Beal 82

,

the court concluded

at 885
(1983)

(not reported in A. 2d)

.
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that the transaction at bar was not protected by the

business judgment rule because it was « totally undirected
to a corporate purpose » 83
a

,

insisting on the fact that when

transaction was totally unconnected to

valid corporate

a

purpose the very nature of the transaction was calling the

business judgment of the board of directors into question,
hence mandating further judicial scrutinity.

Another factor bearing an influence on court's review
of decisions granting compensation to directors or officers
is the approval of such decision by independent

shareholders
B.

RATIFICATION BY SHAREHOLDERS

The rule was originally set forth in Rogers v. Hill 84
In this case,

in accordance with its by-law adopted by

the stockholders at their annual meeting,

the company was

paying its president and vice presidents large amounts in

addition to their fixed salaries and other sums allowed
them as compensation for services 85

.

Plaintiff maintained

that the amounts paid under said by-law were unreasonably

and therefore subject to revision by the court.

large,

The

Supreme Court of the United States rejected this argument
and stated in the contrary that « The by-law was adopted in

83

at

Id.
(1972)

84

53 S.

85 Id.

5,

citing Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker

Ct 731,

at 585

289 U.S.

582

(1933)

,

298 A. 2d 349
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1912 by an almost unanimous vote of the shares represented
at the annual meeting and presumably the stockholders

supporting the measure acted in good faith and according to
their best judgment.!

•••)

Much weight is to be given to

the action of the stockholders,

and the by-law is supported

the presumption of regularity and continuity. » 86

Since

.

the rule has been codified by section 5.03 of the

then,

American Law Institute Principles of Governance 87
as by section 144 of the Delaware Code 88

,

as well

.

Effectiveness of ratification by shareholders

1.

For the ratification by shareholders to be effective,

two essential elements must be present

:

concerned must be voidable and not void,

(i)

(ii)

the act
the

ratification must have been fairly accomplished 89

Michelson

,

.

In

the court indeed held that voidable acts were

susceptible to cure by shareholders approval, while void
acts were not 90

Void acts include gift or waste of

.

corporate assets, ultra vires or fraudulent transactions 91
If an act is deemed void,

86 Id.
p

at 591,

.

it can be cured only by a

592

"7

°'

section 5.03 provides in pertinent part that a director or senior
executive who receives compensation from a corporation for services in
that capacity fulfills the duty of fair dealing with the corporation
if « (4) the compensation is authorized in advance or ratified by
disinterested shareholders... »
88

8

Del.

C,

§

144

2)

(

89

Michelson v. Duncan 407 A. 2d 211 (1979) at 218, citing Kerbs
California Eastern airways 90 A. 2d 652 (1952)
,

,

90
91

Id.

Michelson

v.

Duncan,

407 A. 2d 211

(1979)

at 218,

219

v.
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unanimous shareholder vote 92

Therefore, when the

.

compensation granted to officers or directors of
corporation is challenged as being wasteful, or

a
a

gift of

corporate assets, the defense of shareholder ratification
cannot be used, unless such ratification was unanimous.
Such principle is not new and had already been stated more
than fifty years ago by Rogers v. Hill 93 where the court

mere majority of the shareholders may not

held that

a

condone

waste or gift of the corporate assets to the

a

prejudice of the minority.

Hence,

courts would examine the

facts of the situation, notwithstanding independent

stockholders ratification 94

.

Such waste or gift of

corporate assets has been defined in Rogers 95 as

a

payment

having no relation to the value of services for which it is
given.

On the contrary, voidable acts are those performed

in the interest of the corporation but beyond the authority

and are not classified as being void 96

of management,

the court determine that an act is void,

.

If

it will then look

at the validity of the ratification and by deciding whether
it was fairly accomplished or not.
is one of full disclosure.

The first requirement

Indeed, directors have a

fiduciary duty to fully and fairly disclose all material

92

Id.

at 219

93 289 U.S.
94
95

96

Smith v. Van Gorkom

;

582

Saxe v. Brady

,

488 A. 2d 858

(1933)
,

184 A. 2d.

602

(1962)

Id.

Michelson

v.

Duncan,

407 A. 2d 211

(1979)

at

(1984)at 890
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information within its control when seeking shareholders
approval 97

It must here be

.

noticed that not only does

this full disclosure obligation applies to the facts and

circumstances surrounding the transaction 98

,

but it also

applies to disclosure of the consequences of their vote to

shareholders 99

Disclosure of all « material » information

.

being required, the question courts will have to answer is

whether an alleged omission or misrepresentation is
material.

The question was answered in Arnold v. Society
Inc. 100 which held that

for Savings Bancorp,

An omitted

«

:

fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a

reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
It does not require proof of a

deciding how to vote...

substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact

would have caused

a

reasonable investor to change his vote.

What the standard does contemplate is a showing of

substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.

another way, there must be

Put

substantial likelihood that

a

the disclosure of the omitted fact would gave been viewed

by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered

97

In re Tri-Star picture,

98

Shell Petroleum,

99

Yiannatsis

100
Inc.,

v.

Inc.

Inc

v.

Stephanis

,

.,

Smith

634 A. 2d 319
,

606 A. 2d 112

653 A. 2d 275

650 A. 2d 1270 (1994) at 1277
426 US 438 (1976) at 449

(1993)

(1995)

at 333,

(1992),

334

atll4

at 280

(quoting TSC Indus, v. Northway,

29

the

'total mix'

of information available.

» 101

Finally,

.

the board of directors must balance the potential benefits
of disclosure against its potential harm 102

The second

.

requirement for the ratification by shareholders to be
valid is that the approval be received by

independent shareholders 103

a

majority of the

Such approval by

.

a

majority

of independent shareholders is not statutorily required by

the safe harbor provision of

8

Del.

C,

§ 144.

Nevertheless, Delaware courts have implied that

a

majority

of disinterested shareholders is required to approve an

interested transaction 104

.

Independent shareholders have

been defined as those who are disinterested in the

transaction at issue 105

.

Keeping in mind the condition of

validity of ratification by shareholders, the real question
as far as compensation is concerned is the effect of such

ratification on interested transactions.
Effect of ratification on interested transactions

2.

Such point has been extensively discussed in Lewis v.

Vogelstein 106

,

which begins by stating that the answer to

the question is less clear than one would expect 107

101

id.

102 Arnold v.

Society for Savings Bancorp,

at 1279

103
104

105

.

Gottlieb

91 A. 2d at

,

59

Flieger

,

Lewis

150 A. 2d at 752

,

351 A. 2d

106

699 A. 2d 327

107

Id.

at 334

(1997)

at 221

Inc.,

650 A. 2d 1270

(1994
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Indeed,

the courts have not adopted one broad approach,

but

have concluded that shareholder ratification has different

meaning in different situations.
The first effect of shareholder ratification can be
the extinguishment of

a

shareholder claim.

occurs in two circumstances 108

Such effect

The first one is when the

.

board acted in good faith but exceeded its de jure

authority 109

.

In Michelson 110

,

the plaintiff was alleging

that the board exceeded its authority in fixing or

increasing the compensation the directors would receive,
and in granting

stock option plan for key executive.

a

In

response to this claim, the directors had sought and

obtained subsequent ratification by the shareholders.

The

court held that « it is the law of Delaware, and general

corporate law, that

a

validly accomplished shareholder

ratification relates back to cure otherwise unauthorized
acts of officers and directors...
If shareholders have approved an otherwise voidable

act,

their approval extinguishes any claim for losses based

on prior lack of authority of the directors to undertake

such action. » 111

.

The second case in which

a

shareholder

vote can extinguish a claim is where the directors approved

108

In re wheelabrator technologies,

1202
109 Michelson v. Duncan
110
Id.
111

Id.

at 219,

220

,

407 A. 2d 211

Inc.,

663 A. 2d 1194

(1979)

at 218,

219

(1995)

at

31
a

transaction without reaching « an informed business

judgment » 112

.

Despite the fact that the court found the

ratification invalid in this case, the court found that the
board'

s

lack of due care in approving

voidable act rather than

a

transaction was

a

a

void one, and could accordingly

be sustained if approved by a majority shareholder vote 113

.

Another possible effect of shareholder ratification of an

interested transaction is to invoke

«

the business judgment

rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or

waste » 114

,

thus referring the transaction to the rules

previously studied.
Finally,

ratification by the shareholders can have an

influence on the burden of proof.

The question of the

adequacy of consideration is usually committed to the sound
business judgment of the corporation'

directors.

s

Nevertheless, where the directors have

personal interest

a

in the application of the corporate payments,

i.e.

the

transaction is an interested one, the business judgment
rule no longer applies and the burden shifts to the

directors to affirmatively demonstrate its entire fairness
(the standard of fairness that apply to compensation and

its application will be discussed infra)
a

decision fixing the compensation of

112

Smith v. Van Gorkom

,

488 A. 2d 858

113

id.

114

In re Wheelabrator Technologies,

1203

(1985)

Inc.,

a

.

Therefore, when

director or officer

at 889

663 A. 2d 1194

(1995)

at

32
is an interested one,

the burden of proof will rest upon

The rationale behind

the beneficiary of the compensation.

such a rule has been stated by the Court of Chancery of

Delaware in Wilderman

v.

Wilderman 115

The Court explained

.

that resting the burden of proof upon the interested

directors was justified because of the fiduciary position
which directors held towards their corporation and its

stockholders 116

.

Even if stated some twenty years ago,

such rule is still accurate as directors still owe

a

fiduciary duty to the corporation and its stockholders
nowadays.

Ratification by independent shareholders will

come into play to place the burden back on the plaintiff to

show that the transaction was unfair 117

.

This principle

had been summarized by the court in Kahn v. Lynch

Communications Systems, Inc.

118

as follow

:

« The initial

burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party
who stands on both side of the transaction.

approval of the transaction by

a

However, an

independent committee of

directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders
shifts the burden of proof on the issue of entire

fairness... ».

115 315 A. 2d 610
116 Id.
117

Of course,

that burden will only be shifted

(1974)

at 615

In re Wheelabrator Technologies,

Inc .,

1204
118

638 A. 2d 1110

(1994)

at 1114,

1115

663 A. 2d 1194

(1995)

at

33

if the interested transaction was subject to a valid

shareholder vote 119

.

Whoever bears the burden of proof, the issue is the
one of what has to be proven, or in other words the

standards apply to compensation of officers and directors
by the courts.
II.

STANDARDS FOR A VALID COMPENSATION

Different standards are used by the courts to evaluate
the validity of a decision fixing compensation.

will discuss the three main ones

:

The thesis

reasonableness, the

existence of consideration and fairness.
A.

THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD

We have previously seen that the transaction involving

directors and officers compensation could be an interested
one.

The application of the fairness standard to

interested transactions has been reaffirmed by the courts
in Marciano v. Nakash 120

.

Therefore, entire fairness

applies to transaction fixing officers and directors

compensation.

In the Marciano case 121

Court of Chancery validating

a

,

a

decision from the

claim for loans made by

a

faction owning 50% of the corporation as valid and

119 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.
atlll7-1121
120

535 A. 2d 400

121

Id.

(1987)

,

638 A. 2d 1110

(1994)
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enforceable debt of the corporation, notwithstanding their
origin in self dealing transactions, was challenged.

The

supreme court held that the court of chancery had properly

applied the intrinsic fairness test in determining the

validity of an interested director transaction 122
Plaintiff argued that section 144 of Title

8

.

Del.

C.

provided the only basis for immunizing self interested
transactions, and that since none of the statute's

component tests were satisfied, it could not apply.

123

Thus, plaintiff concluded that common law applied and that

the transaction was voidable per se 124

.

The Vice

Chancellor agreed on the fact that the challenged
transaction did not withstand

a

section 144 analysis, but

nevertheless ruled that the common law did not invalidate

transaction determined to be intrinsically fair 125

.

When

reviewing the decision of the Vice Chancellor, the Supreme
Court confirmed that section 144 did not provide the only

validation standard for interested transactions 126

.

The

Supreme court justified its position by stating that it

would overstate the common law rule to conclude that

relationship was the only controlling factor in interested
transactions

122

id.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

id

126

id.

at 402

;

indeed,

the invalidation of interested

a
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transaction in early Delaware cases was not dictated only
by

a

tainted relationship 127

.

Thus,

the court noted that

Sanitary Co. of America 128 it had been

in Potter v.

emphasized that interested transactions should be subject
to close scrutiny,

and that transaction could be disavowed

by the stockholders where the evidence tended to show that
the personal interest of the directors would be advanced at
the expense of such stockholders 129

.

Similarly,

interested

director transactions have been deemed voidable only after
an examination of the fairness in other cases decided

before the enactment of section 144 130
Forman v. Chesler 131

,

In cases such as

.

the fairness standard has even been

used to justify executives compensation.

Warrants for the

purchase of stock had been issued by the corporation to two
of its officers for services rendered in connection with

the consummation of two transactions.
the corporation'

s

The market price of

shares subsequently rose to about ten

times the value fixed in the warrant.

Plaintiff argued,

among other things, that such subsequent rise in the market
value has resulted, or will result in

a

waste of corporate

assets to the benefit of the warrant holders.

The Supreme

Court of Delaware first stated that « the General

127

Id.

128

194 A>

129

Id.

130

See for example Keenan v. Eshelman 2 A. 2d 581
v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp.
64 A. 2d 581

87

(1937)

at 91
,

Blish

131 167 A. 2d 442

,

(1961)

(1948)
(1948)

at 602
at 602

;
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Corporation Law explicitly authorizes the issuance of stock
options and warrants
duration' » 132

^limited or unlimited in

(Citations omitted)

The Court then added

.

that « it is clear that the statute contemplates that the

warrant holder or optionee may, at least under ordinary
circumstances, lawfully expect to enjoy the advantages of
any future increase in value of the shares,

to the same

extent as if he had invested in the stock itself. » 133

.

The Court justified its position by explaining that any

other conclusion would be unfair to the beneficiary of the
warrant,

and would deprive stock warrants or option of

their essential purpose.

Furthermore,

the Marciano Court

reminds that it has already refused to view section 144 as

completely preemptive of the common law duty of
director's fidelity in Flieger
«

it merely removes an

v.

Lawrence 134

^interested director'

,

a

stating that

cloud when its

terms are met and provide against invalidation of an

agreement ^solely' because such
involved » 135

.

a

director or officer is

The Marciano Court then

adds that the

viability of the intrinsic fairness test is mandated by
situations where shareholders deadlock prevents
ratification, and also where shareholder control by

132 Id.

at 445

133 Id.

at 445

134

361 A. 2d 218

135

Id.

at 222

(1976)

.

37

interested directors precludes independent review 136

.

The

court concludes that in such situations the intrinsic

fairness test furnishes the substantive standard against

which the burden of proof of the interested directors is

applied 137

.

Another standard commonly used by the court in
determining the validity of compensation is the standard of

reasonableness
B.

REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION

In Rogers v.

Hill 138 the court held that « if a bonus

payment has no relation to the value of services for which
it is given,

it is in reality a gift in part ».

Today,

compensation practices used by corporate directors still
come under scrutiny concerning their relationship with

corporate performance 139

.

Therefore,

if funds are to be

applied to officers or directors compensation, such

remuneration must bear reasonable relation to value of
services for which the funds are applied 140

.

The question

then becomes what a reasonable relation to value of

136
137

Marciano

,

535 A. 2d 400

(1987)

at 404

Id.

138 289 US 582

139

See for example The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Pay,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of Government Management of
the Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess.l
(1991)
« ... it is one thing to have spectacular increases for
spectacular performance.
It is another thing to have spectacular pay
increases for dismissal or even mediocre performance. »
:

140 Kaufman v. beal

,

1983 WL 20295

(1983)

(not reported in A. 2d)
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services to be rendered is, and how

determine such reasonable relation.

a

court is going to
The Missouri Court of

Appeals answered those questions long ago by stating that
«

like the reasonableness of an attorney'

s

fee,

the

reasonableness of the compensation paid to an employee is
question of fact.
fee,

[...]

Ordinarily, like an attorney'

a

s

it is not subject to a precise determination by any

known mathematical formula

;

there is no hard and fast rule

to be used in deciding what is reasonable in all cases and

each must be decided on its own facts and

circumstances. » 141
added that

«

(Citations omitted).

Yet,

the court

This is not to say that we are wholly without
for the question of what is reasonable

some guidelines,

compensation, especially at the executive level, has

received attention from both the text writers and the
courts. » 142

(Citations omitted)

.

Also decided some thirty

years ago, this case, as well as the one stating the

standards that they fix to determine the reasonableness of
a

compensation, can be applied nowadays, as they were

stated in

a

way sufficiently general to still be accurate.

The first thing one can look at to determine whether

compensation bears

a

reasonable relation to the value of

the services to be render is the nature and the character
of the services themselves.

141 Ruetz v.

142 Id

Topping

,

It has been said that when

453 S.W.2d 624

(1970;
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compensation or bonuses are voted to directors, they must
be reasonable and commensurate with the value of the

services rendered 143

In Meiselman v.

.

Eberstadt 144 the

court held that the ability of the executive was

factor

a

that needed to be taken into account when looking at the

reasonableness of compensation paid to officer of
corporation.

Thus,

a

the officers of a transportation

corporation that were on duty eighteen hours

day,

a

have

substituted for the hired drivers when needed, have
assisted in making repairs on the road or in the garage, in
other words have « constantly worked for the success of the

enterprise, and have in every way facilitated and made

possible that success » 145 have justified the payment of
weekly salaries of fifty dollars as reasonable compensation
for services rendered to the corporation.

explained that such

a

The court

finding was based on the nature and

extent of the services rendered to the corporation and

described here above 146

On the contrary, based on the

.

same standard a court may find that the bonuses or

compensation granted to directors were purely

a

gift,

and

that « compensation for services » was only a pretense 147
To come to such a conclusion the court noticed that the

143 Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors
1973), s. 6.06, p. 109
144

170 A. 2d 720

145 Massoth v.

(1961)

Central Bus Co.,

134 A.

Cahall,

(1922;

146 id.
147 Lofland v.

118 A.

1

236

(1926)

(2d Ed.

.
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same compensation was given to each of the directors

regardless of the amount of services he rendered, that many
of the extra services claimed to have been performed as a

justification for the remuneration were in fact within the
scope of the duties of the directors and should presumably
have been performed by them 148

.

In conclusion the court

stated that « Many of [the services]

,

if rendered,

were,

not in the organization of the company,

we have said,

as

some

were within the duties of directors, and none were such as
the company could reasonably be expected to pay for » 149

.

One could ask how what « the company could reasonably be

expected to pay for » is measured by the courts.
v.

Brady 150

,

In Saxe

the Court of Chancery of Delaware faced that

same question and indeed noted that « A court is confronted

with inherent difficulties in determining whether payments
for services are

^reasonable'

or

^excessive'

.

The value of

services is obviously a matter of judgment on the part of
the person who must pay for them » 151

(this principle has

been reaffirmed several years later in Kaufman v. Beal 152

)

The court then noted that one way of determining a

reasonable value is

« to

compare the results with amounts

paid to other persons performing the same kind of

148 Id.

at

4

149 Id.

at

4

150 184 A.
151 Id.

152

2d 602

(1962

at 609

1983 WL 20295

(1983)

(not reported in A. 2d)

.
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services » 153 (Citations omitted).

Then,

[flailing to

if «

find any ^shocking disparity' between these two sums, even

though the amount paid to

[a

director or an officer]

exceeded the industry average, the court [should conclude]
that the amount paid were not
Finally,

» 154

^legally excessive'

.

the court held that when taking all the financial

data available,

[r]esolution of the question ultimately

«

depends on the weight to be attributed to each of the very

many economic factors argued to the court » 155

The

.

comparison made by the court between the compensation

challenged and other compensation paid has sometimes been
limited by the courts to
corporation.

a

comparison inside the same

Thus in Wilderman v. Wilderman 156

,

the court

held that in determining the reasonableness of the

compensation courts should consider the amounts previously
received by the concerned director or officer, and the
amount of the challenged salary compared to other salaries

paid by the employer.

On the contrary,

in the recent years

executive compensation has been compared to, and even found

disproportionate to the salaries paid to the senior
executives of foreign corporations 157

153 Lofland v. Cahall
154

Id.

,

118 A.

1

(1922)

.

However, the

at 609

at 610

155 Id. at 611
156 315 A.

2d 610

(1974),

at 614

*->'

See for example Shareholders Rights, Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess. 49 (1991)
« It is undeniably true that
the cash compensation in salary and bonuses granted American CEOs
:

.
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contrasting argument is that foreign compensation cannot
and should not be directly compared to American

compensation because foreign compensation includes perks
which are difficult to value and are generally not granted
their American counterpart 158

.

Therefore,

it is to be

noted that the American Law Institute, in its analysis and

recommendations to corporations, still refers to the
standards of revision of the reasonableness of executive

compensation set several decades ago 159

.

The reasonableness of the compensation can also be

measured by comparing it to the financial condition of the
corporation.

In Wilderman v. Wilderman 160

,

the court held

that one of the factors judicially recognized to determine

whether the compensation of officers or directors is
reasonable is whether such compensation bears
relation to the success of the corporation.
«

a

reasonable

Indeed,

[cjorporate directors, in fixing their salaries as

officers must, of course, have regard for the

reasonableness of the salaries in light of the financial
condition of the corporation » 161 (citations omitted)

generally exceeds that given to similarly situated CEOs in foreign
countries. »
158

Andrew

The Press
1992,

Bronstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay
Congress ? Shareholders ?, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June

R.

?

at 32

159 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance
Analysis and
Recommendations, section 5.03, Compensation of Directors and Senior
Executives (1994)
:

160 315 A.

2d 610

161 Moran v.

(1974)

Edson,

493

F.2d 400

(1973)

?
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Thus,

courts are going to look at the way the business was

run under the officer's management,

the size and the volume

to determine whether the challenged

of the business,

compensation and/or bonuses are fair and reasonable.
Similarly,

in Blish v.

Thompson Automatic Arms Corp.

162

the

court compared the challenged salary of the officer to the

benefits conferred on the corporation by him in determining
the reasonableness of the compensation.

But the court did

not establish any quantitative measure with which to

determine the propriety of executive compensation.
course,

Of

the percentage of the gains of the business granted

must not be unreasonable per se 163

changed in the 1990s.

.

The situation has not

One of the major argument forwarded

supporting the contention that something is still wrong
with executive compensation in America is that such

executive compensation is not related to corporate

performance 164

When discussing this issue, the American

.

Law Institute again referred to Beard v. Elster 165

,

which

was decided in 1960 and nevertheless still provides the

standard to be used by the courts or by the corporations

162 64 A. 2d.

163 Rogers v.

581

(Del.

Hill

1948)

289 U.S.

,

582

(1933)

164 Shareholders Rights, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.,
st
1
Sess. 4 9 (1991)
« Some statistics indicate that the compensation
paid to several chief executive officers bore little, if any,
relationship to the success of the corporation. »
165
160 A. 2d 731 (1960)
:

44

when fixing officers compensation 166

The American Law

.

Institute therefore noted that it will be expected that

adequate procedures will be instituted to ensure that

compensation based on corporate profitability is accurately
calculated 167
Finally,

.

for compensation to be upheld courts used to

require that consideration to the corporation exist, and
that such consideration effectively pass to the

corporation.

The question of the accuracy of the

consideration standard is important because of its link
with the notion of waste.
C.

CONSIDERATION AND THE WASTE STANDARD

The early Delaware cases established that even in the

presence of informed ratification, stock option grants had
to satisfied a two part test 168

.

Indeed,

it was necessary

that the court conclude that the grant contemplates that
the corporation will receive sufficient consideration 169
In Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways,

Inc. 170

,

.

the

Supreme Court stated that « Sufficient consideration to the

corporation may be, inter alia, the retention of the

166 ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance
Analysis and
Recommendations, section 5.03, Compensation of Directors and Senior
Executives (1994)
:

167

Id.

168

id.

169
652

Id., citing Kerbs v.
(1952)

170 90 A. 2d 652

(1952)

California Eastern Airways,

Inc.

,

90 A. 2d

45

services of an employee, or the gaining of the services of
a

new employee, provided there is

reasonable relationship

a

between the value of the services to be rendered by the
employee and the value of the options granted as an

inducement or compensation. » 171

Consideration hence did

.

not look like a waste standard 172

.

If the existence of

consideration was necessary for the compensation to be
it was not enough.

valid,

Indeed,

it was held that in

addition, the plan or the circumstances of the grant had to

include

«

conditions or the existence of circumstances

which may be expected to insure that the contemplated

compensation will in fact pass to the corporation. »

173

.

The court later referred to « circumstances which may

reasonably be regarded as sufficient to insure that the

corporation will receive that which it desires... » 174

.

Such requirement that the corporation takes steps to ensure
the actual transfer of the consideration to it is still

accurate and is restated by the American Law Institute

which reminds that if section 5.03 vests wide discretion in

disinterested directors when adopting compensation
arrangement, they must nevertheless satisfy themselves
« that the

corporation can reasonably be expected to

receive the benefits contemplated by

171 Id.

173 Kerbs v.
Id.

particular

at 656

172 Lewis v. Voqelstein

174

a

,

699 A. 2d 327

(1997)

at 336

California Eastern Airways, Inc., 83 A. 2d 473 (1951)

at 657
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arrangement » 175

Nevertheless, the case of Lewis

.

v.

Vogelstein 176 talk about the consideration standard in
different context

:

a

Delaware law treating shareholder

ratification of corporate plans that authorize the granting
of stock options to corporate officers and directors.

According to this court, the standard of consideration was
at that time used in place of the actual standard of waste.

in this case 177

Furthermore,

the court holds that the use

of those test was in practice very problematic.

Indeed,

valuing an option grant was, and still is, quite

difficult 178

.

The court adds that is even more difficult

to value the future benefit that the corporation hopes to

obtain from the option grant 179

.

In Beard v.

Elster 180

,

the

court stated that the requirement that all stock option

plans contain conditions or that surrounding circumstances
are such that the corporation will receive the benefit

expected constituted the consideration implicit in every
stock option plan by itself.

By doing so,

the Delaware

Supreme Court slightly relaxed the general formulation of
Kerbs, and rejected its reading to the effect that the

175 ALI,

Principles of Corporate Governance
Analysis and
Recommendations, section 5.03, Compensation of Directors and Senior
Executives (1994)
176
177

:

699 A. 2d 327

699 A. 2d 327

178

Id

179

Id.

180 160 A.

2d 731

(1997)

(1997),

(1959)

at 337

47

corporation had to have or insure receipt of legally
cognizable consideration to make an option grant valid 181

.

Furthermore, the court in Beards 182 emphasized the effect
of an approval by an independent board or committee.

indeed held that

a

good faith determination by

It

a

disinterested board of directors or committee that the
corporation may reasonably expect to receive

a

proportionate benefit from the grant of the option entitled
such a grant to business judgment protection, at least when

ratified by

a

disinterested shareholders vote.

The court

in Lewis 183 pointed to the fact that judicial review has

focused more on the procedures used to authorize and ratify
grants,

than on trying to assess whether the corporation in

fact would receive proportionate value 184

,

suggesting that

the criteria of consideration had been abandoned by

Delaware courts, at least in such

a

situation.

The last question to be studied in the thesis is to

determine what will happen if no compensation has been
adopted, or if the decision fixing such compensation is

struck down by the courts.

Does that mean that the officer

or director will have rendered the services for free

Such a statement would seem quite unfair.

Consequently,

the courts have successively used the theories of the

181 Lewis v. Voqelstein
182

160 A.

183

699 A>2 d 327

184

Id.

2d 731

at 338

,

(1959)
(1997)

699 A. 2d 327

(1997)

at 337,

?

33i
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implied contract and the theory of quantum meruit to allow

directors and officers to recover for the services
rendered.

CHAPTER III
IMPLIED CONTRACT AND QUANTUM MERUIT

The problem addressed here could be considered as one
of fairness or equity.

Indeed,

the question is

:

how to

compensate an officer or director for services rendered by
him to the corporation where no compensation has legally
been adopted by the board of directors

?

This question is

addressed by the Court of Chancery of Delaware in

Technicorp International II, Inc.

Johnston 185

v.

.

The

earlier rule of Delaware governing director's and officer's

compensation was fixed Cahall
that

:

-

directors of

a

v.

Lofland 186 which stated

corporation were trustees for the

stockholders and were therefore submitted to the utmost
good faith and fair dealing, especially were their

individual interests were concerned
-

;

they had no right to compensation for services

rendered within the scope of their duties as directors,
unless it was authorized by the charters, by-laws, or the

stockholders of the company
-

;

they had no right to compensation for services

rendered outside their duties

185

1997 WL 538671

186 114 A.

224

(1997)

a

directors unless there had

(not reported in A.

(1921;

49

2d)

50

been an express contract to pay for such services, or
unless the services were clearly outside their duties as

directors and performed under circumstances sufficient to
show that it was understood by the proper officer,
as by the directors claiming the compensation,

services were to be paid for by the corporation
-

a

as well

that the
;

contract to pay compensation for such services

had been made with directors, or officers who had no

personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the contract,
and who were competent to represent the company in the

transaction 187

.

Under this view, to be able to recover for his
services,

director or officer had to prove that an

a

alleged implied agreement had been made with directors or
officers who were disinterested.

In the contrary,

compensation could be recovered.

Nevertheless, the Lof land

Cahall rule no longer control 188

v.

.

no

Nevertheless, such an

affirmation does not mean that directors or officers cannot
recover for their services.
a

Indeed,

courts have recognized

right to recover under the theory of quantum meruit 189

The Technicorp Court points to Hall v. John
Sons Farms 190

187

Lofland

v.

.

In this case,

Cahall

,

118 A.l

188 Technicorp International II,
reported in A. 2d)

189

Id.

190

146 A. 2d 602

at 15
(1958)

S.

Isaacs and

the defendants had voted

(1922)

Inc.

,

1997 WL 538671

.

(1997)

(not

51

themselves salary increases

;

the court acknowledged that

the salaries would be invalid under Lofland v. Cahall 191

,

but still said that « the salary recipients may yet

establish that such payments to them, although unauthorized
by a proper board and not validly ratified by independent

stockholders are recoverable upon
meruit

» 192

.

theory of quantum

a

The reason why the court allowed recovery on

that basis was that there was no evidence that the

executives had purposefully granted themselves excessive
salaries to deprive the minority stockholders of dividends
or to dissipate corporate assets 193

similar conclusion in Wilderman

v.

.

The court reached

Wilderman 194

Therefore, under Hall v. Isaacs and Wilderman

,

a

.

interested

executives may be entitled to recover the reasonable value
of their services on the basis of quantum meruit if they

can demonstrate that

:

they provided services as officers

with the understanding that they would be compensated, they
did not grant themselves excessive compensation to unjustly

enrich themselves, and the corporation which received the
services benefited from them and would be unjustly enriched
if the executives were not compensated 195

.

the

In fine,

court noted that such an approach is consistent with

191

Id at 610,

192

Id.

193

id.

8

611

at 612

194

315 A. 2d 610 (1974)
195 Technicorp International II,
reported in A. 2d)

Inc.

,

1997 WL 538671

(1997)

(not

Del.

52
C.

§

144,

which provides that in specified circumstances

self dealing transaction with directors will not be held

invalid solely for that reason 19 ^.

196

Id.

at 16

a

CONCLUSION

The question of officers and directors compensation is
a

Not only does it govern what

very important one.

officers and director will be able to receive in exchange
for the services performed,

and directors liability.

but it also is part of officers

Such importance of the topic is

even increased by the public scrutiny witnessed in the
1990s,

as was said in the introduction of this thesis.

Therefore, it is useful for the corporation and its

officers and directors to have
allowed,

road map of what is

a

and what is not.

The first point is the one of the fixation of the

compensation

;

who has the power to fix it, and what are

the rules to follow when doing so

?

It is a well settled

rule that the management of a corporation belongs to its

board of directors.

Therefore,

such board of directors

should have the power to fix officers' and directors'
compensation.

When the board of directors fixes officers'

and directors'

salary,

business judgment rule.

its decision is protected by the
In practice,

however, two

doctrines operate to preclude judicial deference to the

business judgment rule.
self-dealing.

First,

the decision may include

Self-dealing being typically considered to

53

54

be a violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,

business judgment rule does not apply.

the

In such a case,

the

self-dealing transaction was

Common Law Rule was that

a

automatically voidable.

Nevertheless, court have stated

that corporate directors may be given the power to fix

their own salary by statute, charter, bylaws or the

stockholders.

courts,

Thus,

as well as most of states

statutes, permit self-dealing transactions if there has

been proper ratification by disinterested directors or

shareholders.

In this regard,

that if at the time

it is interesting to note

director voted in favor of

a

a

resolution fixing salaries or fees, he was disinterested,
the fact that he later became eligible for the benefits

therefrom does not invalidate the resolution.

Therefore,

the first thing a corporation should be able to do with

regard to compensation is to prove that it has been

approved by
board.

a

disinterested board or committee of the

However, if the board has failed to take this

precaution, or if all of the directors are interested as
well

(as

in the case of most closely held corporations),

approval by disinterested shareholders can be used to save
the compensation decision from automatic voidability.
Hence, when the compensation of officers or directors has

not been approved by

a

disinterested board of directors, it

is highly recommended that the corporation seeks approval

by the shareholders.

Indeed,

courts will give a lot of

weight to the action of the stockholders.

Therefore, if

55

stockholders subsequently ratify
or directors compensation,

a

decision fixing officers

courts won't review it.

The

executive compensation decision can also be saved from

automatic voidability as self-dealing if it is proved to be
Such may be the only practical

fair to the corporation.

alternative in closely held corporations.
while

a

transaction can be saved from automatic voidability

if proved to be fair,

it's unfair,

fairness.
a

In Delaware,

it will nonetheless be invalidated if

therefore creating

Consequently,

a

a

dual requirement of

decision may be held invalid by

Delaware court, although it was valid when originally

adopted,

if it appears to be unfair to the corporation.

But such an intervention of the courts will occur only when

really required, only in extreme cases.
The second doctrine operating to preclude judicial

deference to decisions of the board of directors is the
doctrine of waste of corporate assets.

No corporation is

generally permitted to give away or « waste » its assets.
Most courts evaluating compensation considered to be a

waste of corporate assets impose two main requirements for
the compensation to be upheld

there must be consideration

:

passing to the corporation in exchange for the
compensation, and it must bear

a

reasonable relationship to

the benefits received by the corporation.

Concerning the

existence of some consideration passing to the corporation,
courts generally invalidate only compensation that is

clearly in consideration for past services or that require

56

no future service by the beneficiary.

the board of

Hence,

directors should make sure that the decision granting

compensation to an officer or director will secure the
effective transfer of consideration to the corporation,

for

example by binding the beneficiary of the payments by an

employment contract.
one of reasonableness,

But the most important issue is the
i.e.

the existence of

a

reasonable

relationship between the compensation and the benefit of
the corporation.

Payments are evaluated against

a

certain

number of different factors, the most frequently mentioned
being compensation of similar executives in other companies
in the same industry,

the success of the corporation,

the

ability and performance of the executive, and the absolute
size of the payment.

Therefore, the board of directors

should bear all these factors in mind when granting
compensation.

It is important to note here that some of

those factors cannot, and will not be applied by courts

when the compensation consists in the grant of stock
options,

restricted stocks or similar incentive plans.

For

example, when considering the adequacy of the compensation,
one can argue that the link between the executive's

performance and an increase in stock price is doubtful.
Indeed,

it is extremely difficult to determine whether an

increase in stock price is the result of the action of

a

specific executive, or if its due to general good economic

conditions or even the action of
However,

a

former executive.

such form of remuneration must still bear a

57

reasonable relationship with the profit of the corporation,
and the fact that directors are given more discretion does
not mean that there will be no control by the courts.

Hence,

corporations should institute adequate procedures to

ensure that incentive compensation based on corporate

profitability is accurately calculated.
could be interesting for

a

Nevertheless, it

corporation to favor those kind

of remuneration over cash compensation.

The last thing to consider as far as officers'

directors'

or

compensation is concerned is whether such

officers or directors will be able to be compensated in
case of invalidation of the resolution fixing their

compensation, and if yes, how.

Indeed,

even if the

resolution adopting the compensation of officers or
directors is held invalid, in most of the case the

corporation still got some benefit from the services
rendered.

Therefore, the courts will use either the

implied contract or the theory of quantum meruit to allow
the directors and officers to recover for their services.

An implied contract will be inferred from the conduct of
the parties

:

when it appears that the officers or

directors performed some services expecting to be

compensated for them, and the corporation was aware of the
situation, the courts will hold that an implied contract
was created between said officers or directors and the

corporation, and will allow the former to recover the fair
value of the services rendered.

The same result will be

58

obtained by application of the theory of quantum meruit,
which can be qualified as an equitable doctrine based on
the principle that one who benefits by the labor of another

should not be unjustly enriched thereby.

')
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